ABSTRACT Recently, to implement cloud-based machine learning approaches while maintaining data privacy, a scheme named CryptoNets is proposed to perform prediction on encrypted data using neural networks. By applying the leveled homomorphic encryption scheme, CryptoNets enables the cloud server to securely run the computation process without participations of other parties. Since the encryption scheme only supports polynomial operations, the authors simply use square activation as a substitution of the conventional activations, obtaining a relatively low prediction accuracy on the MNIST dataset (98.95%). Later work try to improve the accuracy by using polynomial approximations of the ReLU activation with large neural networks, which introduce heavy computation cost, making the prediction process impractical. In this paper, to achieve better prediction performance, we propose new parametric polynomial (PPoly) activations, which can adaptively learn the parameters during the training phase. Using our PPoly activations, we achieve higher accuracy (99.33%, 99.64%, and 99.70%) with shallow and narrow networks, guaranteeing the efficiency of prediction process. We conduct extensive experiments to show the expressiveness of our PPoly activations and discuss the tradeoff between accuracy and efficiency for the prediction on encrypted data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning as a service (MLaaS) supports machine learning solutions provided by cloud computing services. By using MLaaS, users can submit their data to cloud server for machine learning tasks such as classification and clustering in a pay-per-use mode, saving the implementation cost for users. However, for data from domains such as medicine, finance, and marketing, both the inputs and the outputs of machine learning tasks can be very sensitive. Considering the ethical and legal demands for the privacy and security of the sensitive information, a user might be reluctant or forbidden to use cloud based MLaaS.
To preserve data privacy while using MLaaS, Dowlin et al. present CryptoNets [1] , a scheme allowing making prediction over encrypted data using neural networks owned by the cloud. The encryption method applied in CryptoNets is a leveled homomorphic encryption [2] , which supports both addition and multiplication operations. Therefore, the whole prediction process can be performed on the cloud without the participation of users. This cryptosystem also allows making multiple predictions simultaneously with no extra computation cost by utilizing Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) [3] operations. This is very appealing because the computation time can be amortized which greatly improves the efficiency of the process. Except for these advantages, one limitation of the leveled homomorphic encryption scheme is that it only allows computations in arithmetic circuits with a fixed maximal depth. This implies that conventional activations (e.g., ReLU and Sigmoid) cannot be used on encrypted data, which need to be substituted by polynomial activations. Viewing neural networks as arithmetic circuits, the depth is determined by the degree of polynomial activations and the number of activation layers. Large circuit depth requires using larger parameters in the encryption scheme, thus results in larger size of ciphertexts and more computation overheads. In CryptoNets, the authors simply use a square activation in two activation layers and obtains a prediction accuracy of 98.95% on MNIST dataset [4] , which is relatively low compared to the state-of-the-art solution [5] on plain data with an accuracy of 99.79%.
To improve accuracy, Chabanne et al. [6] use batch normalization method [7] in a deeper network. They first train the network using the ReLU activation and get a prediction accuracy of 99.59% on MNIST dataset. Then they substitute ReLU by its degree 2 polynomial approximation and obtain an accuracy of 99.30%. Obviously, only changing activations in prediction phase will influence the performance of prediction. Different from [6] , Hesamifard et al. [8] present CryptoDL in which a network is directly trained using polynomial activation. Instead of approximating ReLU, they first approximate its derivative and then compute the integral of the polynomial to get a degree 3 polynomial activation. In CryptoDL, the prediction accuracy using polynomial activation is 99.52%, which is close to the accuracy obtained by using the ReLU activation (99.56%).
Although the two schemes [6] , [8] improve the prediction accuracy, they both use much deeper and wider neural networks. As we discussed before, a deep network would result in a large circuit depth, while increase the width of a network would lead to a quadratic growth in computation cost. This would make the prediction process on encrypted data less practical for the heavy computation overheads. Another concern is the unbounded derivative of polynomial activation, which may affect the result of gradient descent algorithm, resulting in blowing up or overfitting for deeper networks [1] .
In this paper, based on the framework of CryptoNets, we focus on improving prediction accuracy while maintaining efficiency for the computation over encrypted data. Different from the previous work [6] , [8] , we do not approximate the ReLU activation, and instead we try to explore the effectiveness of polynomial activations [9] . Specifically, inspired by the work of parametric rectified linear unit (PReLU) [10] , we propose new parametric polynomial (PPoly) activations, which can adaptively learn the parameters of polynomials during the training process. By directly training neural networks using our PPoly activations, we achieve better prediction accuracy with shallow and narrow networks. We present extensive experiments to show the performance of our PPoly activations and analyze the trade-off between accuracy and efficiency for the prediction on encrypted data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the background knowledge in Section II. The new parametric polynomial activations are proposed in Section III. We perform experiments and analyze the results in Section IV. The related work are discussed in Section V. Lastly, we conclude the paper along with the future work in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce the main ingredients used in the framework of CryptoNets [1] : leveled homomorphic encryption (LHE) scheme and convolutional neural network (CNN).
A. LEVELED HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
Homomorphic encryption (HE) was firstly introduced by Rivest et al. [11] which supports computations over encrypted data directly without decrypting the data first.
Some encryption schemes, such as Paillier [12] (resp. ElGamal [13] ) are additively homomorphic (resp. multiplicatively homomorphic), allowing only one algebraic operation on ciphertexts. To calculate both additions and multiplications over encrypted data, the first fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme was proposed by Gentry and Craig [14] in 2009. Since Gentry's work is highly inefficient, more practical schemes [2] , [15] - [19] have been produced in which the leveled homomorphic encryption (LHE) [2] , [15] , [16] schemes achieve better efficiency.
The LHE allows computation of arithmetic circuits with a predetermined maximal depth on encrypted data. Considering a neural network has a fixed arithmetic structure, the YASHE scheme [2] is applied to encrypt the inputs of a neural network in CryptoNets [1] . By using Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) operations, the scheme in CryptoNets supports making a large amount of predictions simultaneously, which greatly improves performance without extra computation overheads. Since the encryption scheme only allows polynomial computations, square activation is used as a substitution of the ReLU activation in the network.
As claimed in CryptoNets, the main restriction of applying the LHE is the requirement of a low circuit depth. In a neural network, the depth is determined by the degree of polynomial activations and the number of activation layers. Therefore, considering efficiency, we should use shallow networks with low degree polynomial activations. There are several libraries (e.g. SEAL [20] and HELib [21] ) that can be used to implement prediction process over encrypted data. We recommend readers to the CryptoNets paper for other practical considerations of using the LHE scheme.
B. CONVOLUTIONAL NEURAL NETWORK
Convolutional neural network (CNN) is a kind of feedforward deep artificial neural networks, which is widely applied in image classification and natural language processing. Typically, a CNN is composed of neurons with learnable parameters (weights and biases). Each neuron receives some input data and computes a dot product, which is followed by a non-linear activation conventionally. The network can be expressed as a leveled circuit, where the layers can be viewed as the levels. Commonly, a CNN contains the following kinds of layers.
• Convolutional Layer A convolutional layer consists of a set of filters that convolve on local regions of the input to learn features from the feeding layer. This operation is a dot product of weights and input values. Thus, the same computations can be performed over encrypted data using LHE schemes.
• Activation Layer A non-linear function is used in an activation layer. Traditional activations such as ReLU (max(0, x)) and Sigmoid (1/(1 + e −x )) are not polynomial functions, which cannot be used in prediction over encrypted data. For better efficiency, we prefer low degree polynomials. Thus, we only use degree 2 polynomial activations in this paper. VOLUME 6, 2018 • Pooling Layer Pooling Layer is applied to sub-sample the data for reducing the data size. There are two main kinds of pooling layers, one is max pooling and another is average pooling. In this paper, we use scaled average pooling [1] since the LHE scheme does not support max operation on encrypted data.
• Fully Connected Layer In this layer, each neuron also calculates a dot product between weights and inputs from the previous layer, which can be directly performed over encrypted values.
• Dropout Layer Dropout is a regularization method for reducing overfitting by randomly ignoring a set of units during the training phase of neural networks. It is later removed in the prediction phase after the training process.
• Batch Normalization Layer A batch normalization layer normalizes each input channel across a mini-batch, which can speed up the training process [7] . In prediction phase, this layer uses trained parameters so that the operation is simply a linear transformation which can be applied for encrypted data.
In literature, a common pattern for creating CNNs is to add an activation layer after a convolutional layer, i.e., [Convolutional → Activation]. Then, a pooling layer is added after a list of this blocks which forms a new
→ Pooling]. In CryptoNets [1] and CryptoDL [8] , the authors add convolutional layers without activation layers after them, which is claimed to resolve the overfitting issue introduced by using the polynomial activations [1] . This will make the consecutive layers collapsed since only linear transformations are used. In this paper, we choose to use the common CNN blocks. We show in the experiments that by using a small number of these blocks is enough for a high prediction accuracy.
III. PARAMETRIC POLYNOMIAL ACTIVATIONS A. DEFINITION
In this section, inspired by the work of parametric rectified linear unit (PReLU) [10] , we propose new parametric polynomial (PPoly) activations which can adaptively learn the parameters jointly with the entire model. As discussed before, to minimize the circuit depth, we consider polynomials with the lowest degree 2, which is essential for the efficiency of the scheme. Formally, a polynomial activation of degree 2 is defined as:
Here x i is the input of the polynomial activation p on the ith channel, and c i1 and c i2 are learnable parameters. The subscript i in c i1 and c i2 represents that the polynomial activations on different channels might be different. This is the channel-wise version of the PPoly activations. We emphasize our method is very different from previous approaches [1] , [6] , [8] using fixed polynomial parameters, in which a square activation is applied in CryptoNets [1] and polynomial approximations of ReLU are used in the work [6] and CryptoDL [8] .
Channel-wise PPoly activations just introduce a small amount of extra parameters, which is equal to twice the number of channels. This is negligible comparing to the total number of parameters in the network. Similar as in PReLU [10] , we also consider a channel-shared version:
in which the coefficients are shared by all channels in one activation layer. This channel-shared version only introduces two extra parameters into each activation layer. It is noted that the idea of training polynomial parameters is also mentioned in [6] . However, the authors first train a network using the ReLU activation and then replace it with the polynomial approximation. Since polynomial activations are not directly used during the whole training process, they only obtain a low prediction accuracy of 99.30% on MNIST dataset with a large neural network using 6 convolutional layers. On the contrary, applying our PPoly activations, we achieve much better prediction accuracy with shallower and narrower networks.
B. OPTIMIZATION
Parametric polynomial activations can be trained using backpropagation [22] and updated with other layers at the same time. The optimization formulations of c ij (j ∈ [2]) can be derived from the chain rule. The gradient of c ij for one activation layer is:
where θ is the objective function. The term ∂θ ∂p(x i ) represents the gradient propagated from the deeper layer. The gradients of the polynomial activation are given as:
The summation x i runs over all values of the feature map. For the channel-shared version, the gradient of c j is given as:
where i sums over all of the channels in one activation layer. The Nesterov momentum algorithm [23] is used to update c ij and other parameters in the network. We also add weight decay (l2 regularization) to reduce overfitting problem. We randomly initialize c ij in the range of [−1.5, 1.5] so that the polynomial activations might be non-monotonic.
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
In this section, we perform extensive experiments to show the prediction performance of neural networks using our new PPoly activations. The experiments consist of two main parts. In the first part, we train networks using the ReLU activation, the square activation [1] and the proposed PPoly activations (both channel-shared and channel-wise versions). Then we compare the prediction accuracy using these activations. We find that the models using our PPoly activations achieve better accuracy. In the second part, we conduct prediction on encrypted data with models using our channel-wise PPoly activation. The prediction accuracy and computation costs are compared with the outcomes in the previous work. The experiment results show that we can obtain better prediction performance in both accuracy and efficiency by using the proposed PPoly activations.
As shown in Figure 1 , Figure 2 and Figure 3 , we use three models containing different convolutional layers in the experiments. In the figures, the input size of a network is 28 * 28 * 1 and ''Conv8'' (resp. ''Conv16'' and ''Conv32'') represent a convolutional layer with 8 (resp. 16 and 32) filter channels. Concisely, we use ''Conv-BN-Act'' to represent a convolutional layer followed by a batch normalization (BN) layer and an activation (Act) layer. Similarly, ''AvePool-Drop'' means an average pooling (AvePool) layer followed by a dropout (Drop) layer. We apply two fully connected (FC) layers in the networks, and the second ''FC'' layer is followed by a ''Softmax'' layer to make the prediction. We do not use padding in convolutional and average pooling layers. The filter size in each convolutional layer is 3 * 3 and the stride length of convolution is set to 1. The pooling size is 2 * 2 and the stride value is set to 2.
In Model A, we apply one convolutional layer which only has 8 filter channels. While in Model B, two convolutional layers are used which have 16 and 32 filter channels respectively. The most complex model is Model C with four convolutional layers, in which the first two layers have 16 channels and the last two layers have 32 channels. We claim that our models are relatively shallow (less convolutional and activation layers) and narrow (less filter channels), which results in less circuit depth and multiplication operations. This is very important for the efficiency of implementing the leveled homomorphic encryption scheme. We use the MNIST [4] dataset and all experiments were conducted on Windows with Intel Core i7-8700K 3.70 GHz CPU and 64 GB RAM.
A. PREDICTION PERFORMANCE USING DIFFERENT ACTIVATIONS
In this section, we use the Keras library to train the three models using different activations from scratch. The optimizer used for training is stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with a Nesterov momentum of 0.9. The initialized learning rate is 0.1 with a learning rate decay of 10 −6 over each update. We also drop the learning rate to half of it after every 20 epochs. We add dropout (30%) after convolutional layers and dropout (60%) after the first fully connected layer. For other hyper-parameters, the weight decay is 0.0005, the minibatch size is 128, and the number of epochs is fixed as 200 for each model. We do not use data augmentation in the training phase.
The testing accuracy and testing loss (cross entropy loss) of the three models are shown in Figure 4 , Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively. We present the curves from epoch of 60 to avoid drawing the large fluctuations during the early epochs.
As shown in Figure 4 , for Model A which has one convolutional layer with 8 filter channels, using our PPoly activations and the square activation lead to a better prediction performance than using the ReLU activation. This illustrates the good expressiveness of polynomial activations in the very shallow network. During the training process, both two versions of our PPoly activations show higher testing accuracy and lower testing loss than the square activation. In Figure 4a , our channel-wise PPoly activation achieves the highest prediction accuracy. While in Figure 4b , the lowest testing loss is obtained using our channel-shared PPoly activation. Figure 5 gives the prediction results of Model B, which contains two convolutional layers with 16 and 32 channels separately. As we can see in Figure 5a , applying the square activation in the model results in lower testing accuracy than using the ReLU activation. While using our PPoly activations still leads to better prediction accuracy than that using the ReLU activation during the training process. Our channel-shared PPoly activation shows higher accuracy than that of its channel-wise variant before epoch of 160 and they have similar testing accuracy after that. In Figure 5b , using the channel-shared PPoly activation achieves lower testing loss than all other activations during the whole training process. The channel-wise version also performs better than the ReLU activation but the difference of losses becomes small after epoch of 160. For the square activation, it has similar testing loss as that of the ReLU activation before epoch of 140 and has larger loss after that.
When we trained Model C, a deeper network containing four convolutional layers, we found that using the square activation and our channel-shared PPoly activation failed to make the network converge. Therefore, we only show the testing results of the ReLU activation and our channel-wise PPoly activation in Figure 6 . As shown in Figure 6a , using the two activations in Model C result in similar testing accuracy. While in Figure 6b , the testing loss of the two activations are also very close before epoch of 150 and after that the ReLU activation achieves slightly lower loss.
We record the best testing accuracy during the training process and show them in Table 1 . For Model A, using the three polynomial activations achieve much higher accuracy (about 99.30%) than using the ReLU activation (99.05%). And using our PPoly activations result in slightly better prediction performance (99.33% and 99.31%) than using the square activation (99.27%). For Model B, using our PPoly activations still lead to higher accuracy (99.64% and 99.63%) than using the ReLU activation (99.56%). However, using the square activation only obtains a lower accuracy of 99.46%. For Model C, using the ReLU activation and our channel-wise PPoly activation result in similar testing accuracy, 99.72% and 99.70% respectively. While using the other two polynomial activations cannot make the model converge.
B. PREDICTION PERFORMANCE ON ENCRYPTED DATA
In this section, we give detailed experiment results on encrypted data and carefully analyze the prediction performance of different models. Comparing with the models in the previous work, we achieve higher prediction accuracy using the proposed PPoly activations in shallower and narrower networks, which require much less computation overheads. To emphasize, similar as the previous work [1] , [6] , [8] , we do not consider the efficiency comparison between encrypted data and plain data. Using Keras library, it only needs less than 1 millisecond to predict one plain figure, while making prediction on encrypted data costs much more, increasing by an approximate factor of 7000, 40000 and 250000 for Model A, Model B and Model C respectively. This is required for the utilization of leveled homomorphic encryption scheme.
We use SEAL library [20] to implement the prediction processes of our models on encrypted data with a security level of 128 bits. In the prediction process, one convolutional layer and its following batch normalization layer are composed into a single linear layer (''conv-bn'' layer) to reduce computation overheads. Similarly, the first fully connected layer and its following batch normalization layer are also combined together (''fc-bn'' layer). In experiments, the inputs of networks have integer pixel values between 0 and 255. We scale the parameters in ''conv-bn'' and polynomial activation layers with 10 3 and scale the parameters in ''fc-bn'' layer and the second fully connected layer with 10 5 . The models using scaled parameters maintain the same accuracy of their original versions. As shown in Table 2 , we summary the experiment results of six models. We use the channel-wise PPoly activation in our three models, since they achieve better prediction accuracy as given in Table 1 . For comparison, we provide three other models, in which the model in CryptoNets [1] use square activation and the models in the work [6] and CryptoDL [8] use non-trainable polynomial activations.
To emphasize, we did not train the three models in the previous work and the prediction accuracy listed in the table are provided from the original work [1] , [6] , [8] . We evaluate the computation cost of one prediction process by first multiplying the number of a certain operation and its cost, and then adding up the results. The detailed values for evaluation are given in the Appendix A. To test our evaluation method, we also compute the cost of our models in the same way and the evaluation time of our Model A and Model B (575 s and 8015 s in Table 5 ) are very close with the real implementation time (617 s and 8182 s in Table 2 ). However, the execution time of our Model C (14657 s in Table 2 ) is less than its evaluated result (25024 s in Table 5 ). This is because in the experiments, some of the scaled weights in the convolutional layers of Model C are zeros, so we can save the corresponding cost of ciphertext-plaintext multiplications in the implementation by just setting the results to the encryption of zero. Still, we claim our evaluation method is reasonable since most of the scaled parameters in the model should be nonzero to maintain the prediction performance. We also give an approximate number of primes by evaluating the scale of the network output for each model, which will be used to compute the prediction time for a single figure (discussed later in Equation (6)).
In the table, ''Conv structure'' represents the structure of convolutional layers in a model, giving the number of layers and the number of filter channels in each layer. A larger number of convolutional layers requires more following polynomial activation layers, while a larger number of filter channels needs much more dot product computations (plaintext-ciphertext multiplications). The ''Circuit depth'' is the total multiplicative depth of a network, which is determined by the number of polynomial activation layers and the degree of polynomials. A larger circuit depth requires more noise budgets for the encryption scheme and therefore leads to a larger polynomial modulus (''Poly modulus'' in Table 2 ). A larger polynomial modulus makes ciphertext sizes larger, and consequently makes all operations slower. We can see that we use a small modulus of 8192 when the circuit depth is 2 and a large modulus of 16384 is applied for deeper networks.
Next, we discuss the computation cost of the prediction on encrypted data. One advantage of the YASHE [2] encryption scheme (the leveled homomorphic encryption scheme applied in SEAL) is parallel computation, which is achieved by Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) [3] operations. Assume the polynomial modulus is N , then we can simultaneously predict N figures without extra cost. Since the encryption scheme does not support floating-point numbers, we need to scale them into integers before encryption. However, this scaling method leads to exponentially large output values of the network in the prediction process. In CryptoNets [1] , the authors propose an approach to solve this issue by using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). The idea is to use a set of primes and conduct identical prediction process for each of them. Then we can use CRT to decode back the result as long as the output values of the network are all smaller than the multiplication of the primes. With the increase of network depth (more polynomial activation layers), the prediction output values grow rapidly and more primes are needed to guarantee the correctness of CRT. This means that we need to linearly increase computation time with the number of primes used.
Assume the computation cost of one prediction process for a single prime is T seconds (''Cost of one process (s)'' in Table 2 ) and the number of primes (''Num of primes'') is n p . Then, we can compute the prediction time t (in seconds) for a single figure (''Prediction time per figure (s)'') as
in which N is the polynomial modulus. In experiments, we find that changing the primes does not greatly affect the cost of the prediction process, therefore we assume all costs are the same for different primes and list them in Table 2 . Now we analyze the prediction performance on encrypted data. First, we compare the experiment results of the model in CryptoNets [1] and our Model A, which both have a very shallow circuit depth of 2 and use a small polynomial modulus of 8192. By using our Model A with channel-wise PPoly activation, we obtain a prediction accuracy of 99.33%, while the model in CryptoNets only has a low accuracy of 98.95%. For the computation cost, our Model A consumes more time than the model in CryptoNets, since more ciphertext squaring and plaintext-ciphertext multiplication operations are required in Model A. With a prediction time of 0.68 seconds for a single figure, our Model A achieves a higher prediction accuracy, performing even better than the model in [6] (99.30% accuracy) which has a much more complex network structure.
When we use two convolutional layers in our Model B, the circuit depth increases to 3. We find that the noise budgets are not enough for correctly decrypting the ciphertexts with a polynomial modulus of 8192. Thus, we have to use a larger modulus of 16384 to provide more noise budgets. By doing this, the computation cost of a single operation grows to about 4 times of that using the modulus of 8192. With more ciphertext squaring and plaintext-ciphertext multiplication operations as well as a larger number of primes, it takes 7.99 seconds for our Model B to make a prediction on encrypted data. Comparing with Model A, our Model B needs much more computation time to improve the prediction accuracy from 99.33% to 99.64%. We see that, by using only two convolutional layers, the prediction accuracy of our Model B surpasses that of the larger model in CryptoDL [8] (99.52%), which shows the good expressiveness of our proposed PPoly activations. Our Model C contains four convolutional layers and has a circuit depth of 5. With two extra polynomial activation layers than Model B, the output values of Model C grow much larger, which requires 56 primes to guarantee the correctness of CRT. Finally, we achieve an accuracy of 99.70% with a cost of 50.09 seconds to predict one figure.
Next we analyze the computation cost of the two models in the previous works [6] and [8] . Both of these two models have 6 convolutional layers with large filter channels. In practice, widening a network would lead to a quadratic increase in computation cost. For these two models, one prediction process requires about 2.18 × 10 7 plaintext-ciphertext multiplication and 6.45 × 10 4 ciphertext-ciphertext multiplication operations. While for our Model C, only 2.59 × 10 6 plaintext-ciphertext multiplication and 2.54 × 10 4 ciphertextciphertext multiplication operations are needed. We approximately evaluate the prediction cost for these two models by multiplying the number of certain operations and the cost of one corresponding operation. The results show that one prediction process needs about 2 × 10 5 seconds for these two models. One difference the two models is that in the activation layers they use polynomials with different degrees. The network in [6] has 6 activation layers using degree 2 polynomials, while the network in [8] has 3 activation layers using degree 3 polynomials. Therefore, the prediction output of the model in [6] is much larger than that of the model in CryptoDL [8] . Based on this, we give the approximate number of primes for the two models in Table 2 . As shown in the table, the prediction time for one figure are 1233.51 and 620.19 seconds for the two models, which cost much more than our three models using the proposed PPoly activations.
V. RELATED WORK
Machine learning as a service (MLaaS) is growing rapidly which provides prediction for users in a pay-per-use mode. To utilize neural network with high level of accuracy as well as preserving data privacy, Dowlin et al. propose CryptoNets [1] , which supports prediction over encrypted data using a trained neural network in a cloud server. In CryptoNets, the particular encryption method is a leveled homomorphic encryption scheme (the YASHE scheme [2] ) that allows additions and multiplications over encrypted data with a fixed arithmetic circuit depth. Since only polynomial operations are supported over encrypted data, the authors use the square activation as a substitution of the traditional activations (i.e., Sigmoid and ReLU). By leveraging Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) [3] operations, CryptoNets achieves a high throughput by simultaneously making multiple predictions without extra cost. However, CryptoNets only achieves a prediction accuracy of 98.95% on MNIST dataset, which is much lower than that given by the state-of-the-art solution [5] (99.79%).
Later, two other work [6] , [8] based on the framework of CryptoNets achieve higher prediction accuracy of 99.30% and 99.52% respectively. In the work [6] , Chabanne et al. add batch normalization layers before activation layers to deal with the problem of unbounded derivative of the polynomial activations [1] . They first train a network using the ReLU activation and then substitute ReLU by its degree 2 polynomial approximation in the prediction phase. Since a much larger network is applied for prediction, a higher accuracy of 99.30% is obtained compared with the result in CryptoNets. Nevertheless, since the scheme is not an end-to-end training, the result by using polynomial activation is still lower than the accuracy by using the ReLU activation (99.59%). In another work CryptoDL [8] , the authors first approximate the derivative of the ReLU activation using degree 2 polynomial and then calculate the integral of this polynomial to get a degree 3 polynomial. The degree 3 polynomial activation is directly used in the training phase of network and a prediction accuracy of 99.52% is achieved. This is close to the accuracy by using the ReLU activation (99.56%). Although higher prediction accuracy are obtained in these two work, they both use much larger and wider networks than the network in CryptoNets. This leads to very heavy computation overheads for prediction on encrypted data (shown in Table 2 ). Therefore, we should consider both accuracy and efficiency when we apply the leveled homomorphic encryption scheme.
Recently, Bourse et al. [24] present another scheme FHE-DiNN for homomorphic prediction using neural networks. In this framework, the computation cost is linear with the depth of the network by using bootstrapping procedure. However, they use the sign function as the activation function and thus only obtain a low prediction accuracy of 96.35% on the MNIST dataset by using a small neural network with 100 hidden neurons. Although FHE-DiNN only needs 1.64 seconds for one prediction, it does not support SIMD, which makes it not practical for large volume of data. There are also other schemes using secure multi-party computation (SMC) methods to achieve the privacy preserving prediction using neural networks [25] , [26] . However, these approaches require interactive protocols between cloud and users which might leak some private information from the intermediate results.
Different from the previous work, in this paper, we focus on exploring the effectiveness of polynomial activations. Instead of approximating the ReLU activation, we introduce trainable parameters into the polynomials and adaptively learn the parameters during the training phase. By doing this, we achieve better prediction accuracy by using shallow and narrow networks, which guarantees the efficiency of computation over encrypted data.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposes new parametric polynomial activations, in which the parameters can be learned during the training process. We perform extensive experiments to show the expressiveness of the proposed PPoly activations in different neural networks. Compared with the previous work, we achieve better performance in both accuracy and efficiency, making the prediction process on encrypted data more practical. We claim that the main reason to improve prediction efficiency on encrypted data with better accuracy is the good expressiveness of our PPoly activations in shallow and narrow networks. In future work, we plan to focus on the theoretical analysis of the proposed PPoly activation as well as investigate the initialization method of the parameters for better accuracy improvement.
APPENDIX
Here, we provide the numbers of operations over encrypted data in the models as well as the computation time of each operation in SEAL library. The results are shown in Table 3 and Table 4 . In Table 3 , ''Mul'' represents multiplication between ciphertexts and ''Mul plain'' represents multiplication between ciphertext and plaintext. The other operations are all performed on ciphertext. The ''Relinearize'' operation is used to decrease the size of the ciphertext back to 2 after it has been increased by multiplications. The computation time in Table 4 are obtained in single-threaded execution under corresponding polynomial modulus (''Poly Modulus''). We can see that the square operation is more efficient than the multiplication operation, which are used in all the models with degree 2 polynomial activation. We only need ''Mul'' operation in the model of CryptoDL [8] , since it uses a polynomial activation of degree 3.
Using these values, we can evaluate the approximate computation cost for each model by multiplying the number of a certain operation and its corresponding cost, and then add up the results. The evaluated cost of one prediction process are given in Table 5 . 
